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THE EXIT MYTH: FAMILY LAW, GENDER ROLES,
AND CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD FEMALE
VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCEt
Carolyn B. Ramsey*
This Article presents a hypothesis suggesting how and why the
criminal justice response to domestic violence changed, over the
course of the twentieth century, from sympathy for abused women
and a surprising degree of state intervention in intimate relationships to the apathy and discrimination that the battered women'
movement exposed. The riddle of declining public sympathy for female victims ofintimate-partnerviolence can only be solved by looking beyond the criminal law to the social and legal changes that
created the Exit Myth.
While the situation that gave rise to the battered womens
movement in the 1970s is often presumed to be part ofa long history
of state tolerance or even approval of violence against women, the
real history is actually much more complicated. Indeed, at least until
1930, wife beaters were routinely brought to criminal court and
fined or sentenced to a jail term. Whereas wife killers often faced life
imprisonment or even the death penalty, juries acquitted many
women who used lethal violence against their abusive husbands.
What happened between the 1920s and the later decades of
the twentieth century that changed how the public and the criminal
justice system responded to domestic violence? This Article offers the
following hypothesis: As women gained the vote and sought easy access to divorce, and as mothers of minor children began to compete
for jobs formerly held exclusively by men, society and the criminal
justice system less often saw abused wives asfrail beings who needed
protection against their violent husbands. Changes in employment
opportunities, family and property law, and psychosocial undert @ 2013, Carolyn B. Ramsey.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. I would like to thank Joanna
Grossman for commenting on an early draft of this Article at the 2012 Law &
Society Association Annual Meeting and fellow panelists Rebecca Probert, Gail
Savage, and Danaya Wright for their insights and encouragement. Thanks, too, to
Aya Gruber for inviting me to present my ideas at a conference on "The Feminist
Influence on Criminal Law: Past, Present, and Future" at the University of Colorado
Law School. This Article also benefitted from helpful editing and cite-checking by
my research assistant Ashley Beck and the staff of the Michigan Journalof Gender &Law.
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standings of intimate relationshipscombined to create a false sense of
the ease with which women could exit an abusive marriage. This
overestimation ofwomen ' ability to leave, paired with the new view
that women did not need to be protected in paternalisticways, contributed to waning sympathy for female victims of intimate-partner
violence. In the second half of the twentieth century, such women
were presumed-often unfairly and incorrectly-to be capable of
safely leaving their relationshipsand supporting themselves. As gender roles changed to allow greaterfemale autonomy, the criminal
justice response may have become more punitive and less sympathetic
toward women trapped in violent intimate relationships.
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Article proceeds from two premises. First, experts in law and
criminology maintain that, in the second half of the twentieth century, police approached domestic violence cases in an apathetic, discriminatory
manner,' and women who killed their batterers had difficulty obtaining self1. SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES
OF THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 157-61 (1982); G. Kristian Miccio, A

House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatizationof the
Battered Women's Movement, 42 Hous. L. REV. 237, 239, 269-70, 276-77 (2005);
Joan Zorza, The CriminalLaw ofMisdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 47-48 (1992); See also, e.g., EVE S. BUZAWA, CARL

G.

BuzAWA, & EVAN STARK, RESPONDING To DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE INTEGRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN SERVICES (4th ed., 2012); James B.

Halsted, Domestic Violence: Its Legal Definitions, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 143, 155 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G.
Buzawa eds., 1992); Isabel Marcus, Reframing "Domestic Violence:" Terrorism in the
Home, in THE PUBLIC NATuRE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF Do-
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defense acquittals.2 Second, archival research by the Author and other historians shows that, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the state
intervened more aggressively in violent intimate relationships, from assault
and battery cases to homicides, than scholars have previously recognized.3 In
the late 1800s and early 1900s, a variety of actors in the criminal justice
system responded with sympathy to the plight of female victims of domestic
violence, 4 whereas they tended to condemn and punish men who transgressed prescriptive norms of masculinity by battering or killing their female

MESTIC

ABUSE 11, 21-22 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds.,

1994).
supra note 1, at 170-74; ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BAT112-47 (2000); Martha R. Mahoney,
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,90 MIcH. L. REV.
1, 83-93 (1991).

2. See, e.g.,

SCHECHTER,

TERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING

3. For the author's extensive archival research on this subject between approximately
1860 and 1930, see generally Carolyn B. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention in the American West and Australia, 86 IND. L.J. 186 (2011) [hereinafter
Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention] (discussing state intervention in
murder and assault and battery cases). See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide:
Gender and Crime Control, 1880-1920, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 101, 141-56 (2006)
[hereinafter Ramsey, Intimate Homicide] (discussing the prosecution, conviction, and
punishment of men who killed their wives and girlfriends in New York and Colorado in the late 1800s and early 1900s). Scholarship on England and Australia harmonizes with the author's findings on the United States. Eg., MARTIN J. WIENER,
MEN OF BLOOD: VIOLENCE, MANLINESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN VICTORIAN

(2004) (documenting the increasingly punitive legal outcomes for men
accused of killing their wives or girlfriends in Victorian England). Carolyn Strange
similarly contends that jealousy and wounded pride were usually considered insufficient to justify femicide in Australia around the turn of the twentieth century.
Carolyn Strange, Masculinities, Intimate Femicide, and the Death Penalty in Australia,
1890-1920, 43 BIrr. J. CRIMINOLOGY 310, 333-34 (2003).
ENGLAND

4. See Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 3, at 237-38,
241-43, 249-54; Carolyn B. Ramsey, A Diva Defends Herself Gender and Domestic
Violence in an Early Twentieth-Century Headline Trial, 55 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1347,
1347-67 (2011) [hereinafter Ramsey, A Diva Defends Herself (analyzing the selfdefense acquittal of an abused woman charged with murdering her abusive husband
in Nevada in 1909); Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 3, at 118-40 (discussing
acquittals and lesser offense convictions of female murder defendants who killed
violent, male intimate partners). Jeffrey Adler and Marianne Constable have also
noted that juries in Chicago tended to apply "unwritten" law to spare wronged
women who used lethal force against abusive spouses. See Jeffrey S. Adler, "I Loved
Joe, But I Had to Shoot Him' Homicide by Women in Turn-of the-Century Chicago, 92
J. CuMi. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 883-84 (2002); See also Marianne Constable,
Chicago Husband-Killing and the "New Unwritten Law", 124 TRIQUARTERLY 85,
89-91 (2005) (discussing how the unwritten law spared women in Chicago, especially when they acted out of fear of their batterers).

4

MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW

[Vol. 20:1

partners.' Assuming the empirical validity of the first premise, 6 this Article
explores how and why attitudes toward female victims of intimate-partner
violence became less sympathetic in the mid twentieth century.
From the late 1800s through the early 1900s, the state intervened in
the family to enforce an ideal of separate spheres. The home was only
treated as a sanctuary if both husband and wife played their proper roles.
When they didn't, they were called to account in the criminal courts. At
least until 1930, most of this intervention focused on men who transgressed
norms of protectiveness toward women: men were prosecuted for battering
and murdering their female intimates, while women's use of self-defensive
violence against their male partners was often deemed justifiable. Rather
than ignoring violence that occurred behind a veil of family privacy, the
state and the public condemned abusive husbands for misusing their
power-and often for violating prescriptive ideals of temperance and hard
work, as well.7 Around the middle of the twentieth century, the tables seem
to have turned, and women's campaign for political, social, and economic
independence was blamed for the demise of the traditional family.
This Article presents the riddle of declining public sympathy for female victims of intimate-partner violence and suggests that it can only be
solved by looking beyond criminal law to the social and legal changes that
created the Exit Myth. What happened between the 1920s and the later
decades of the twentieth century that altered how domestic violence was
viewed by the public and handled by criminal justice personnel? This Article offers the following hypothesis: as women gained the vote and sought
easy access to divorce and as mothers of minor children began to compete
for jobs formerly held by men, society and the criminal justice system less
often saw abused wives as frail beings who needed protection against their
violent husbands. Changes in employment opportunities, family and property law, and psychosocial understandings of intimate relationships combined to create a false sense of the ease with which women could exit an
abusive marriage.8 This overestimation of women's ability to leave, paired
with the new view that women did not need to be protected in outmoded
Victorian ways, contributed to waning sympathy for female victims of intimate-partner violence.
5. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 3, at 141-56; See Ramsey, Domestic Violence
and State Intervention, supra note 3, at 199-204, 206-30.
6. The Author is currently conducting archival legal history research to test such a
premise, but in this Article, she primarily relies on other scholars' work and suggests
a hypothesis to explain differences between their findings on the later twentieth century and her work on the criminal justice response to domestic violence before 1930.
7. See infra notes 15-21, 132.
8. See infra Parts 1II, IV, and V.
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In the second half of the twentieth century, the media popularized
"disease" theories of why marriages fail that blamed women for domestic
abuse.9 Police officers began to view domestic violence calls as annoyances
occasioned by unsympathetic women who wasted state resources on
problems of their own creation.' 0 Abuse victims lost the paternalistic sympathy of the public and the legal system. The "why didn't she leave?" question
became an impediment to self-defense and other legal arguments that
abused women had formerly made with success, and the state became more
reluctant to intervene by arresting and prosecuting male batterers before a
homicide resulted." When female defendants stood trial for killing their
batterers, they could no longer assume that social attitudes would compensate for deficiencies in the formal doctrine of self-defense. Ironically, as gender roles changed to allow greater female autonomy, the criminal justice
response may have become more punitive and less sympathetic toward
women trapped in violent intimate relationships.
Part II of this Article describes changes in the criminal justice system's
response to domestic violence-from surprising efforts to intervene in intimate relationships in the late 1800s and early 1900s to the unresponsiveness
and unfairness which battered women's advocates started to address in the
1970s. Part III discusses how the rise of popular divorce and the reform of
laws governing child custody and the division of property in the second half
of the twentieth century impoverished divorced women and caused them to
be blamed for the demise of the traditional family. At the same time, they
were erroneously thought to have gained easy avenues of escape from intimate-partner violence. Part IV explores the history of paid work by women
and contends that female employment did not seriously challenge the status
quo until the mid 1900s, when middle-class mothers of young children
began to take jobs outside the home. This new type of female worker was
both celebrated and criticized for her independence in a manner that belied
the formidable impediments to pay equity, affordable childcare, and freedom from job discrimination that remained. Despite women's growing autonomy, paid employment did not provide an unobstructed exit for abused
wives. Part V explains that, in the late 1800s and early 1900s, women who
stayed in violent intimate relationships were often viewed as rational actors.
Yet, in the second half of the twentieth century, psychological theories
pathologized broken marriages and victims of intimate-partner abuse and
cast battered wives as diseased, masochistic, and even irrationally violent
toward their husbands.
9. See infa notes 180-183 and accompanying text.
10. See infa notes 26-30, 184-188 and accompanying text.
11. See infa notes 26-34 and accompanying text.
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In short, this Article offers a historical hypothesis about the Exit Myth
that explains how the late nineteenth-century state's intervention in intimate relationships to protect abused women and punish violent men transformed, by the middle of the twentieth century, into the familiar script of
apathy and discrimination that battered women's advocates criticize. It provides an analytical and theoretical road map that the Author is using to
guide her research for a book project on the legal history of intimate-partner
violence, and it encourages other scholars to delve deeply into the complex
and often surprising legal history of an issue that has generated important
policy analysis in our own time.
11.

CHANGES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM'S RESPONSE
To DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

The standard narrative about public responses to domestic violence
describes a history of apathy and discrimination toward abused women.
Much of the relevant scholarship refers to cases and policies from the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s that indicate widespread reluctance to arrest men for assaulting their female intimates or acquit women on self-defense grounds
when they killed their abusers.12 But those findings cannot be generalized to
the early part of the century. In the United States during the late 1800s and
early 1900s, male perpetrators of domestic violence from all social classes
were treated more severely than is often assumed,13 while women successfully introduced evidence of past abuse to make their claims of self-defense
credible to juries when they stood trial for killing their batterers.4 Male
defendants who were convicted faced substantial sentences. 5 When they
killed their wives or girlfriends, they were often sentenced to life imprisonment or even the death penalty.' 6
Close analysis of cases from this earlier period demonstrates that, although the state failed to prevent intimate-partner violence from occurring,
12. See, e.g., SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 157-61; Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence
Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, at 2 [hereinafter Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism];
Mahoney, supra note 2, at 83-93; Miccio, supra note 1, at 276-77; Zorza, supra
note 1, at 47-48.
13. See infra notes 15-21. For further discussion of how domestic violence cases "crossed
class lines to implicate otherwise respectable families," see Ramsey, Domestic Violence
and State Intervention, supra note 3, at 201 & nn.85-86.
14. See infra notes 22-24.
15. See Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 3, at 206-213 (discussing substantial fines and prison terms for wife beaters).
16. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 3, at 141-56; See Ramsey, Domestic Violence
and State Intervention, supra note 3, at 222-30 (discussing prison sentences and capital punishment for men who killed their female intimate partners).

2013]

THE EXIT MYTH

7

it did not ignore the problem. Police responded to calls for help, and courts
routinely forced violent men to pay fines or spend time in jail for wife
beating."7 Legal materials and newspaper reports on such cases reveal widespread condemnation of male violence against women and the repudiation
of husbands' claims to a right to use corporal punishment on disobedient
wives."' The failure of state efforts to prevent recidivism and the escalation
of intimate-partner violence was likely attributable to the general disorganization of early police departments and the reluctance of abused women to
prosecute their husbands, rather than to widespread misogyny.19
Nevertheless, women's inability to escape intimate-partner abuse was
connected to their subordination and the absence of a social safety net to
protect them. Then as now, victims who lacked viable options for exit from
an abusive relationship often resisted the incarceration of their batterers,
even if they had initially sought the assistance of the criminal justice system.
Far from allowing domestic violence to occur behind a wall of family privacy, however, courts in the late 1800s and early 1900s tried various approaches, including contempt sanctions, to encourage victims to cooperate
with state efforts to prosecute and punish violent men. 20 Although many
assault and battery cases were dismissed, these dismissals generally occurred
despite police and prosecutorial efforts to impose criminal liability on wife
beaters, not because of tacit approval of domestic violence.21
Scholars have also overestimated the extent to which female defendants had to rely on insanity claims.22 Sympathy for abused women, including willingness to believe their self-defense arguments, was a common
feature of intimate murder cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Abused women could and did present evidence of past abuse to
help juries understand why they used lethal violence against their male intimate partners. 23 Even in non-confrontational cases, the unwritten law justifying a wronged woman's retaliation for abuse allowed many female
17. See Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 3, at 199-204,
206-13.
18. See id. at 202-03, 212-13.
19. Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 3, at 165-76 (attributing the failure to prevent intimate-partner homicide to a variety of factors, including the corruption and
brutality of the early police departments, as well as to battered women's reluctance to
call upon the state for help); see Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention,
supra note 3, at 213-220 (discussing victims' reluctance to prosecute and state efforts
to respond to that dilemma).
20. See Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 3, at 213-20.
21. Id. at 220.
22. See id. at 237 n.305 (collecting citations).
23. Ramsey, A Diva Defends Herself supra note 4, at 154-56, 163-65; See Ramsey,
Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 3, at 236-54.
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defendants to obtain acquittal when the facts of their cases did not comport
with black letter self-defense doctrine.24
The picture presented in this Article is not a static one. If accounts of
the criminal justice system's apathy toward intimate-partner violence in the
1960s, 1970s, and even the 1980s are believed2 5 then sympathy for abused
women must have declined as the twentieth century proceeded. In the second half of the twentieth century, police training manuals discouraged officers from making arrests in domestic violence cases. 26 When Tracy
Thurman successfully sued the City of Torrington, Connecticut, for $2.3
million in damages in 1984,27 alleging that the local police department facilitated her husband's vicious stabbing of her by failing to respond to her
numerous past requests for protection, her case put the spotlight on police
apathy toward intimate-partner violence and forced legal settlements in
Oakland, California and New York City.28 One California case involved an
abused wife who sued police for refusing to arrest her batterer, failing to
offer her medical assistance, and failing to protect her over a three-year period during which she reported several violent and harassing incidents, obtained a restraining order, and got a divorce. 29 Newspaper reports from the
second half of the twentieth century also provide anecdotal evidence of such
discrimination and apathy.30
24. Constable, supra note 4, at 88-89, 91; Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 3, at 249-54; Ramsey, A Diva Defends Herself supra note 4, at
1363-65. See Adler, supra note 4, at 883-84.
25. See supra note 1.
26. Zorza, supra note 1, at 47-49 (discussing policies in Michigan and in Oakland,
California); see SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 157-61 (providing a similar account of
how police in several cities in the 1970s avoided arresting batterers or even responding to domestic violence calls). Leigh Goodmark notes that the American Bar Association actually discouraged police from bringing domestic violence cases to court to
reduce docket pressure on "harried and overworked judges." Goodmark, Autonomy
Feminism, supra note 12 (citing Jaffe et al., The Impact of Police Laying Charges, in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION

27.
28.

29.
30.

62, 69

(N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993)).
Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
Bruno v. Codd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979); Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism,
supra note 12, at 2; Miccio, supra note 1, at 276-77; see, e.g., Balistreri v. Pacifica
Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1988), amended on other grounds, 901 F.2d
696 (9th Cit. 1990).
Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 698.
See, e.g., Carol Honsa, ProsecutorBrushed Off Wrong Wife Beating Complaint, WASH.
POST, Sept. 22, 1966, at E21 (reporting on the stabbing of a woman who "told of
six years of unsuccessful attempts to have her husband arrested for beating and
threatening to kill her"). The same article further stated that prosecutors frequently
"tell the women to return home and try to reconcile domestic problems, or suggest
they see a clergyman or social welfare agency for counseling." Id. Even cases that led
to criminal charges often resulted in acquittal because "many of our jurors don't feel

20131

THE EXIT MYTH

9

Finally, in the infamous case State v. Norman,3 1 the defendant Judy
Norman called the police to her home to complain that her husband J.T.
had beaten her all day. Saying they could not arrest J.T. without a warrant,
the officers advised the defendant to file a complaint; she declined to do so,
out of fear that J.T. would retaliate.32 She fatally shot her husband-who
had beaten, tortured, and humiliated her throughout their twenty-five-year
marriage-only after she had repeatedly asked for police assistance, tried to
get J.T. committed to a mental hospital, and sought welfare benefits so she
could leave him.33 In her case and others like it, the judge refused to instruct
the jury on self-defense. 4
Battered women's advocates hailed mandatory arrest laws passed in
twenty states and pro-arrest policies adopted throughout the country after
the Thurman case as "a victory for every woman [like Tracy Thurman and
Judy Norman] who had begged for police protection from her abuser to no
avail."35 Yet, even when the legal system of the late twentieth century acknowledged abuse survivors' cries for help, mandatory arrests and mutual
orders of protection sometimes obscured the fact that the man was the predominant aggressor or, at best, thrust the woman into a system that put
separation and prosecution ahead of her own priorities.36
that knocking your old lady around is grounds for locking up a working man." Id
John Theban, Director of Family and Child Services, told the Post that "the woman's
story illustrates the lack of legal protection for women in domestic violence cases."
Id Two years later, the daughter-in-law of a police chief leveled similar allegations
against officers in Prince George's County, Maryland, claiming that "police deliberately avoided arresting her husband, James Panagoulis, though she swore out a warrant last week for his arrest" and had made repeated complaints against him in the
past. See Panagoulis In-Law Raps Police Force, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1968, at C7.
31. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).
32. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 10.
33. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 10-11.
34. Norman, 378 S.E.2d at 10, 12 (affirming the trial court's refusal to give jury instructions on perfect or imperfect self-defense on the grounds that the defendant did not
honestly or reasonably believe that using lethal force was necessary to save herself
from imminent death or great bodily harm). See Mahoney, supra note 2, at 85-93
(discussing State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988) and State v. Norman, 378
S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989)).
35. See Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism, supra note 12, at 3; Leigh Goodmark, Law Is
the Answer? Do We Know thatfor Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy ofLegal Interventions
for Battered Women, 23 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 7, 15 (2004).
36. Mahoney, supra note 2, at 76. See Leigh Goodmark, Reframing Domestic Violence
Law and Policy: An Anti-EssentialistProposal, 31 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 39, 46-47
(2009) (criticizing modern domestic violence policy for emphasizing "a narrowly
defined set of options for women who have been battered: arrest, prosecute, secure a
protective order, go to a shelter, get a divorce"); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on
Crime, 92 IowA L. REv. 741, 750-51 (2007) ("Reformers have embraced incarcera-
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III. HOW THE REFORM OF DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND MARITAL
PROPERTY LAWS CONTRIBUTED TO THE CREATION OF
THE EXIT MYTH

The rise of unsympathetic attitudes and policies toward female domestic violence victims in the mid twentieth century stemmed from misperceptions of women's growing independence. The reform of divorce and marital
property laws contributed to the erroneous view that all wives could safely
leave their marriages and support themselves by working outside the home.
In fact, such reforms actually proved detrimental to the socioeconomic position of many divorced women. 37
Starting in the late 1800s, a few states began to liberalize their divorce
laws in response to the emerging ideal of companionate marriage and practical pressures to give abused wives an escape hatch, 38 make remarriage possible, legitimize the birth of additional children, and enable women whose
husbands had deserted them to sell land.3 By 1857, fault-based divorce was
available in California on grounds of "mental cruelty," as well as physical
violence.4 0 Similar legal developments occurred in other Western states, including Nevada, before the beginning of the twentieth century.4 1 Permissible reasons for divorce were also expanded to include a spouse's habitual
drunkenness, impotence, narcotics addiction, non-support, felony conviction, or adultery. 42
tion and separation models, despite a plethora of gender and race-based scholarly
critiques.").

37. See infa notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
38. J. HERBIE DIFoNzo, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 13-14, 44 (1997); LAwRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVEs: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE LAW 41
(2004); HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DiVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 27-28 (1988); Ramsey, Domestic Violence and
State Intervention, supra note 3, at 195.
39. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES, supra note 38, at 32-33.

40. ROBERT GRISWOLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA,

1850-1890: VICTORIAN ILLUSIONS AND EVERYDAY REALITIES 19-20 (1982); see JoANNA L. GROSSMAN
& LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH
CENTURY AMERICA 163 (2011).

41. PAULA PETRIK,
MOUNTAIN

No

STEP BACKWARD: WOMEN AND FAMILY ON THE ROCKY

1865-1900 106 (1990);
Kathryn Dunn Totten, "They Are Doing So to a Liberal Extent Here Now": Women
MINING FRONTIER, HELENA, MONTANA,

and Divorce on the Comstock, 1859-1880, in COMSTOCK WOMEN: THE MAKING OF

A MINING COMMUNITY (Ronald M. James & C. Elizabeth Raymond eds., 1998).
42. Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law andPractice before No-Fault,
86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1501-02 (2000) [hereinafter, Friedman, A Dead Language];
see GROSSMAN

& FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 161-62. Despite laws that were
facially gender-neutral, however, courts in many states continued to allow divorce
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Lawrence Friedman and Joanna Grossman maintain that, after 1870,
most divorce cases were collusive-that is, the spouses agreed to get a divorce, and then the wife filed suit accusing the husband of a major breach of
the marriage contract, such as extreme cruelty. The husband waived his
right to respond, and the judge granted the divorce.4 3 This was "common,
ordinary, typical, and everybody-certainly all the judges and lawyersknew it," Friedman argues, even though statute and case law made such
collusion illegal." While real cases of extreme cruelty occurred, many were
fabricated.45
Such accounts may underestimate the amount of wife beating that
occurred in the late 1800s and early 1900s and overstate social and legal
tolerance for it, however. 4 6 Turning from faked cruelty as grounds for divorce to the criminal courts' struggle with the very real problem of domestic
violence, a somewhat different picture emerges. Cruelty was an accepted
basis for divorce because physically attacking, or even mentally tormenting,
a spouse was widely considered wrongful. Judges may have winked at the
invented nature of many extreme cruelty allegations, but that does not mean
that society or the courts trivialized domestic violence. Indeed, in the early
decades of the twentieth century, newspapers and law enforcers thought
that many divorce cases involved the same kind of contemptible assaults
that brought injured women and their batterers into police court.
For example, the Los Angeles Times noted in 1908 that four wife-beating cases had been reported to the city's police department during a twoweek period and commented, "[s]imilar stories, told in the divorce courts,
show that there are scores of such affairs [i.e. beatings] that are never made
public until the long enduring women seek relief by separation."4 7 Frustrated with the ineffectiveness of fines, jail sentences, and public condemnation to deter recidivism, the L.A. police chief joined the captain of
due to adultery only when the wife was the offending party. Friedman, Private Lives,
supra note 38, at 30.
43. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 167; Friedman, A Dead Language,
supra note 42, at 1504.
44. Friedman, A Dead Language, supra note 42, at 1506-07. See FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE
LIVES, supra note 38, at 34.
45. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 165 (citing MAXINE B. VIRTUE, FAMILY
CASES IN COURT 90-91 (1956)); Friedman, A Dead Language, supra note 42, at
1530.
46. See Friedman, A Dead Language, supra note 42, at 1530 ("There were violent husbands, husbands who beat their wives, drunk or sober, night and day. Yet the law
paid little attention to real domestic violence.").
47. Give Lash to Such Brutes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1908, at 110. The same article stated
that during an eight-month period, the police had responded to reports of "scores of
wife beating cases in this city." Id
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detectives and a prosecutor in advocating the whipping post for wife

beaters. 4 8
Newspapers echoed such sentiments,4 9 and journalists also argued that
"[d]ivorce is sometimes the only way to safeguard the family idea."5o Feminist writer Rheta Childe Dorr pointed out that men who abused their wives
had already destroyed the marriage before the divorce occurred." The media thus encouraged a vigorous criminal justice response, in tandem with
easier access to divorce.
Nevertheless, legally terminating a marriage remained difficult prior to
the mid twentieth century, and, even thereafter, it offered no panacea for
victims of intimate-partner violence. Several scholars place the rise of an
alternative system of divorce at the trial-court level later in American history
than Friedman does. J. Herbie DiFonzo locates the beginning of intense
cultural pressure to make divorce more accessible in the 1920s and 1930s,
rather than in the late nineteenth century. 52 According to Herbert Jacob,
divorce remained an anomaly associated with scandal in the early 1900s,
unless the divorc6e was an entertainer "where the stigma added to an artist's
mystique."5 Most states waited until the 1920s to expand the statutory
grounds of cruelty to include mental anguish, in keeping with new psychological research. 4 In any event, legal historians agree that the infiltration of
no-fault concepts into the statutory divorce scheme-which Friedman dubs
"creeping no-fault"55-did not occur until the middle of the twentieth century, when a substantial minority of states began to allow divorce based on
incompatibility after separation for a specified amount of time.5 6 Thus, un48. See id.
49. For example, the writer of the article discussed above stated: "The police have arrested these men, the justices have fined them, or sent them to prison, the newspapers have denounced them as ruffians and in many cases they have lost their
positions, but their punishment has not been a lesson to others." Id. For further
examples of journalistic condemnation of wife beaters, see Ramsey, Domestic Violence
and State Intervention, supra note 3, at 202-03.
50. DIFoNzo, supra note 38, at 13 (quoting Margaret Deland, from a 1910 article in
the Atlantic).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 11.
JACOB, supra note 38, at 27.

DiFoNzo, supra note 38, at 11.
Friedman, A Dead Language, supra note 42, at 1525-27 (stating that nineteen or
twenty states had adopted "creeping no fault" statutes by 1950); see GROSSMAN &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 172-76 (discussing the "creeping decay" of the faultbased system from the 1930s to the 1960s).
56. See DIFONZo, supra note 38, at 11, 67-87; JACOB, supra note 38, at 169-70 (indicating that most changes were low-risk moves that involved grafting concepts of
irretrievable breakdown onto statutes listing fault-based grounds).
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til at least the mid 1900s, it was commonly understood that abused women
felt trapped in their marriages by social pressures as well as by the substantial
threat of violent retaliation if they left.
"In the second half of the twentieth century," Friedman writes, "the
demand for divorce grew even stronger, and the political and social forces
opposed to divorce reform grew weaker." 5" Voices sympathetic to battered
or simply unhappy spouses were not the only ones heard, however. While
opponents could not stem the rising tide of divorce, they generated a significant backlash that had a lasting, deleterious effect on the way American
society viewed abused wives. At mid-century, powerful people and institutions, especially the Catholic Church, opposed the expansion of statutory
grounds for divorce,59 and polls in the 194 0s indicated significant distaste
for the easy, migratory divorces obtainable in Nevada.60 Most importantly,
the conservative opposition tried strenuously to reassert the trope of separate
spheres-this time not to police violent men, but to attack the new roles
and avenues to independence that women sought.
Critics of divorce in the 1940s and 1950s blamed women for the "demoralization" of modern marriage and contended that the wife's "greed for
alimony marked her as the responsible party in the now unseemly rush to
the divorce court."6 1 In fact, though, women rarely sought, and courts rarely
granted, alimony. At the turn of the century, alimony was requested in only
13.4% of all divorce cases and granted in only 9.3%.62 In the 1910s and
1920s, it was granted in about 15% of cases. 63 Although those numbers rose
slightly in the post-war period, "[a]ttacks on alimony achieved a vituperative

57. As criminal cases and newspaper reports document, men often stalked, attacked, and
even killed their estranged wives after these women sought to leave their marriages,
and judges and jurors often sympathized with the female victims. See, e.g., Ramsey,
Domestic Violence and State Intervention, supra note 3, at 241-43 (analyzing the selfdefense acquittal of Bridget Waters, a California woman, whose estranged husband
threatened her with a gun); Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 3, at 147-50
(discussing the conviction of men who committed separation murders). Moreover,
courts looked beyond victims' expressions of love and forgiveness to the other reasons abused women feared pressing domestic violence charges, such as their concern
that they would be unable to feed and care for their children if they left their husbands or got them imprisoned. Ramsey, Domestic Violence and State Intervention,
supra note 3, at 215.
58. Lawrence M. Friedman, Family: United States Law, in 3 THE OxFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 53 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2009).
59. DiFoNzo, supra note 38, at 32-33.
60. Friedman, A Dead Language, supra note 42, at 1504.
61. DIFoNzo, supra note 38, at 11.
62. Id. at 62.
63. Id at 63.
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tone entirely out of kilter with [its] economic impact."6 4 Alimony was seen
as "a windfall for recipients and a crushing burden on those forced to pay,"
despite the fact that courts ordered it in only one-quarter of divorce cases
after World War II, and the awards remained modest.6 5 Indeed, leaving a
marriage was extremely risky for the wife, not the least because the common-law system of distributing property according to title, which the husband typically held, meant that a divorce could leave the wife destitute. 66
Still, "greedy" women who instigated divorce became scapegoats for the
breakdown of marriage. 67
The woman-blaming tenor of anti-divorce rhetoric also suffused efforts in the 194 0s, 1950s, and 1960s to get estranged couples to sign conciliation agreements. During this period, the therapeutic divorce movement
sought to "recast the divorce court as a psychoanalytic institution, modeled
after the juvenile court"68 and to cure sick marriages by reestablishing a
strict gender-based division of labor. 6 9 Under a typical agreement imposed
by the Los Angeles Conciliation Court, for example, the couple admitted
that they needed professional help to heal their diseased relationship. To
achieve reconciliation, they reiterated their allegiance to a gendered social
order in which the wife would take care of housework, childcare, and meal
preparation, while the husband would do exterior maintenance on the
home and yard and provide for the family financially.70 The court's contempt power could be used to reinforce the conciliation agreement, and
offenders who breached it could be imprisoned and fined.71 Under this therapeutic approach, modeled after the recommendations of Ohio Judge Paul
Alexander, marital problems became "medicalized." While the family court
might ostensibly allow divorce without a showing of fault, it, and "not the
impulsive couple, would decide when the marriage was beyond repair."72
Thus, at least in theory,73 the state became not only the arbiter of divorce,
64. Id. at 107.
65. Id. at 107.
66. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 193.
67. DIFoNzo, supra note 38, at 111.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Id. at 113. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 174; FRIEDMAN, A Dead
Language, supra note 42, at 1531-33.
70. DIFONZO, supra note 38, at 130.
71. Id. at 132. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 174; Friedman, A Dead
Language, supra note 42, at 1532-33.
72. DIFONzo, supra note 38, at 118.
73. Grossman and Friedman indicate that few couples actually reconciled in California,
in contrast to the success of Judge Alexander's court in Toledo, Ohio, in the 1950s.
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 175-76.
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but also a stern hand imposing gender stratification in the family, in the
name of science, rather than legal precedent.
Although the therapeutic divorce movement had spread widely
throughout the United States by the 196 0s, it was ultimately subsumed by
no-fault divorce. The no-fault movement got its first foothold in California,
a state where therapeutic approaches had been in vogue.7 4 Proponents of the
California law sought to replace the fault-based charade with a system more
closely linked to a clinical model and to address a variety of procedural
concerns, including the frequent occurrence of perjury.7 1 Signed in 1970 by
then-Governor Ronald Reagan (himself a divorc6), the California law eliminated the traditional fault grounds and instead permitted divorce on a
showing of incurable insanity or "irreconcilable differences which have
caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage."7 6 It also mandated the
equal division of property and made alimony only temporary support.77 By
1974, forty-five states had a no-fault procedure.71
Several scholars have noted that proponents of the California law
neither espoused radical aims, nor associated themselves with any of the
social movements of the 1960s.7 But as no-fault laws took root around the
country, what started as essentially a technocratic reform acquired an unexpected potency: Sweeping away the separation period that many states'
"creeping no-fault" statutes had required, the new laws made possible relatively quick, unilateral divorce based simply on one spouse's feeling that the
marriage was unsatisfactory.so In contrast to the fault system, in which a
party who wanted to defeat the divorce suit could raise defenses, such as

74. JACOB, supra note 38, at 45, 65.
75. See DIFONzo, supra note 38, at 137, 145-47.
76. JACOB, supra note 38, at 59-60.
77. Id. at 60.
78. Id. at 80. However, only fifteen states completely eliminated fault provisions from
their divorce laws and adopted irretrievable breakdown as the sole grounds for divorce. The other thirty simply added a no-fault procedure to their laws to give
couples a choice between irretrievable breakdown and one of the traditional grounds,
and some of these states actually allowed divorce after a very short separation, instead
of making the change explicit. Id at 80-81. In other words, the adoption of no-fault
divorce across the country occurred incrementally. Id. at 102.
79. Id. at 50-51, 60. Jacob makes a similar point about the adoption of the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act, a model statute, endorsed by the American Bar Association in 1974, that was influential in spreading no-fault divorce beyond California.
See id at 65-68, 70, 77.
80. "No longer did conjugal dissolutions have to be bargained for in the shadow of the
formal law. No longer did the parties have to negotiate at all." Rather, the passage of
the California no-fault statute "resulted in boundless divorcing .
DIFONzO,
supra note 38, at 170.
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recrimination and forgiveness,81 no-fault laws extended the promise of individualism and an unobstructed exit. They did so by creating the impression
that a wife could leave her marriage with relative ease and sufficient financial means to begin a new life, apart from her ex-husband.
For battered women, however, this proved to be a myth. The failure of
the divorce "revolution" to provide more than an illusory exit for abused
wives arose, in part, from formal-equality changes to alimony and the division of property at divorce, which Martha Fineman argues "were separate
from and cannot be considered merely part of no-fault legislation."82
ter
the Supreme Court's invalidation of gender-based alimony statutes in Orr v.
Orr,83 courts reduced or eliminated already meager awards on the theory
that the ex-wife should not be encouraged to "live a life of physical and
mental indolence."84 Increased job opportunities for women and new rules
for distributing property at divorce theoretically made alimony outdated.5
By the 1980s, the common-law allocation of property based solely on legal
title had disappeared. Courts in most states tended to order a roughly equal
division of marital property, whether they followed equitable distribution
rules or community property rules. In some equitable distribution states,
factors like fault and the wife's non-economic contribution might be considered.8 6 However, because the value of most marital estates was small, simply dividing the property, rather than providing for ongoing support, often
caused the primary caregiver in the broken marriage great financial distress.87 Courts began routinely to impose child support obligations in the
1970s, but such awards were not mandatory, and they varied widely. Moreover, many husbands did not pay. 8
Some feminist scholars have contended that these changes resulted in
unfairness, inconsistency, and the impoverishment of many divorced
mothers.89 According to Martha Fineman, for example, the new property
rules
81. See id. at 55-56. See also Friedman,A Dead Language, supra note 42, at 1508-09.
82. Martha L. Fineman, Neither Silent Nor Revolutionary, 23 L. & Soc'Y REV. 945, 946
(1989) (reviewing HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1988)).
83. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
84. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 202.
85. See id. at 202-03.
86. See id at 196-200, 206-09.
87. See id. at 203-04.
88. Id at 224, 229-30.
89. Mary Ann Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980s, 44 LA. L. REv. 1553, 1556
(1984) (criticizing equitable distribution schemes for allowing too much judicial discretion). See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY
OF DEPENDENCY 120 (2004) (noting that, after the rise of no-fault laws, "women
found themselves and their children destitute at divorce"); DEBORAH L. RHODE,
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[R]emove[d] economic security for women by abolishing the
common law obligation of a husband to support his wife and
children (even after the marriage end[ed]). Women now share[d]
an equal obligation in regard to children, and a divorced
wife .

. [might] be saddled with her 'equal' share of family (or
husband's) debts even though she . . . [was] far from 'equal' in
.

job and salary prospects.90
By the late 1980s, half of all single-parent families were living below the
poverty line, and divorced or separated women headed the vast majority of
them.91 While marital property provisions symbolically acknowledged the
increased contribution of women, especially middle-class women, to the
family economy through paid work, the practical reality was much bleaker.
Women who got divorced found that they had little property in their own
names and that their earning capacity had been damaged by their prioritization of care-giving. The gender pay gap, which exists at all wage and skill
levels, was (and still is) particularly great for women of color.92 Hence, although African-American women often have greater financial independence
from their partners than white women do, "[b] reaking up the family means
breaking up potential resources" that are already scarce, due to the relative
poverty of many black couples.9 This may lead some African-American
women to stay in abusive relationships, rather than separating or seeking a
divorce. 4
The presence of children complicates the problem. From the late
1800s through the 194 0s, the "tender years" doctrine gave custody to the
149 (1989) (contending that, although many women greeted no-fault procedures and the equal division
of property at divorce as a boon to women's status, "what apparently escaped notice
were the inequalities in men's and women's status following divorce"). In a study
widely criticized on methodological grounds, Lenore Weitzman argued that no-fault
divorce improved men's standard of living, while drastically harming women's standard of living. LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DVORCE REVOLUTION 339 (1985); Lenore Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of
Property, Alimony, and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1249-53
(1981). Yet, despite skepticism about Weitzman's use of data, many studies indicate
that divorce has a harsher impact on women and children than it does on men. See
4
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 203 & n.7 .

JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEx DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw

90. Fineman, Neither Silent nor Revolutionary, supra note 82, at 948.
91. RHODE, supra note 89, at 149.
92. See GROSSMAN

& FRIEDMAN,

supra note 40, at 198-99.

93. Zanita Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender Stereotypes in
Gender Violence, 8 COLUM.

J.

GENDER & L. 1, 50 (1998).

94. See Leigh Goodmark, When is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She
Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 104 (2008).
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mother due to her presumptively greater purity and domesticity.9 However,
the cultural assumptions underlying this doctrine also burdened her with
unpaid childcare responsibilities, and hence financial dependency, that
made separation or divorce from her violent husband difficult. Conditions
of dependency on abusive spouses were perhaps especially great for middleclass, white women who historically had a brief or limited role in the work
force, if they worked outside the home at all.96 The paternalistic policies of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries at least had the limited
virtue of acknowledging such women's predicaments.
For example, in 1914, a Los Angeles Police Court judge proposed sentencing wife beaters to compulsory labor on public projects so that the state
could provide their families with financial support.97 In his view, such a
proposal addressed the reason so many wives sought probation, rather than
incarceration, for their breadwinning husbands: "Why does she do it? Just
because she has to have the money that the man can earn and take home to
her. The real punishment in these cases falls on the helpless ones already
wronged by the man's act."98
Sex discrimination suits in the 1970s made maternal preference in custody awards unconstitutional, but divorced women continued to be the primary caretakers of children in most cases. If they sought to work full-time
or to go back to school to improve their earning potential, they risked losing
custody of their children.9 And, as we shall see, although societal attitudes
gradually became more accepting of mothers' employment outside the
home, women continued to be paid less and to have fewer employment
opportunities than men. 0 0 Thus, the image of the liberated woman that
began to suffuse American culture in the 1970s masked residual impediments to leaving a violent relationship.
Moreover, no-fault divorce allowed courts to ignore one spouse's
mental and physical abuse of the other'o1-a failing that states have only
95. JACOB, supra note 38, at 128-30.
96. See infra notes 114-115, 118-126, 135-144, 149-151 and accompanying text.
97. Would Lessen Wife's Burden: Labor Not Imprisonment, for Brutal Husbands,
L.A.TIMEs, Mar. 25, 1914, at 117.
98. Id. (quoting Police Court Judge White). Another judge, who usually treated wife
beaters severely, suspended a sentence of 50 days in jail for defendant John Ryan
when his wife begged for her husband's release on the grounds that "if the husband
went to jail their little ones would go hungry." Gave Him a Chance, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1901, at 10.
99. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 217-19.
100. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
101. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Sex, Lies, andDissipation: The Discourse ofFault in
a No-Fault Era, 82 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2554-56 (1994). But cf GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 40, at 206-07 (noting that although the Uniform Marriage and
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recently begun to remedy at the behest of battered women's advocates.102
Starting in the mid 1970s, divorce statutes brushing aside fault were often
combined with state laws that favored the joint custody of children. By the
late 1980s, thirty-four states had made joint custody an option, and some
even had a presumption in favor of it.1o3 Such laws, which fathers' rights
groups spearheaded in California and elsewhere,o4 constituted a backlash
against working mothers and their call for fathers to take on a greater role in
child-rearing.io5 In cases of domestic violence, joint custody facilitated abusive men's continued control over (and physical attacks on) their ex-wives
and children, even after the ink had dried on the divorce papers.
Joint custody provisions-adopted under the guise of formal equality-still allow a barterer to use violence and coercion against his ex-wife
and to withhold child support payments if he is deprived of his children's
companionship. Even states like Colorado, which have adopted statutory
provisions requiring judges to use caution in allocating mutual decisionmaking authority over minor children when one divorcing spouse has
abused the other,,o6 often retain "friendly parent" provisions.107 Such provisions may cause the court to see a battered mother as vindictive and obstructive if she insists on supervised visitation or sole custody without
revealing the history of domestic violence, or if that history is misinterpreted as one of mutual conflict.os
Divorce Act of 1970 urged property division without regard to fault, some states
continued to consider the divorcing spouses' behavior, including domestic violence).
102. Eg., Colorado law now requires the judge to take into account whether one parent
has been a perpetrator of spousal abuse in allocating decision-making authority (i.e.
legal custody), over the objections of the other spouse or the child's legal representative, unless "the court finds that the parties are able to make shared decisions about
their children without physical confrontation and in a place/manner that is not a
danger to the abused [party]." COLO REv. STAT. § 14-10-124(1.5)(b)(V) (Westlaw
through Second Regular Sess. and First Extraordinary Sess. of the 68th General Assembly). Colorado statutes also require the court to consider whether one spouse has
engaged in child abuse or child neglect in allocating both decision-making and
parenting time (i.e. physical custody or visitation). See COLo REv. STAT. %§14-10124(1.5)(b)(IV), 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(lX), & 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(X).
103. GROSSMAN
142-43.

&

FRIEDMAN,

supra note 40, at 222; JACOB, supra note 38, at 140,

104. See JACOB, supra note 38, at 137, 142.
105. See Fineman, supra note 82, at 947-48.
106. See supra note 102.
107. Under COLo REv. STAT. § 14 -10-12 4 -1.5(a)(VI)(Westlaw through Second Regular
Sess. and First Extraordinary Sess. of the 68th General Assembly), for example, Colorado courts are directed to consider "the ability of the parties to encourage the
sharing of love, affection, and contact between the child and the other party."
108. According to Clare Dalton, for example:
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In short, changes in laws governing divorce, child custody, and marital
property division contributed to a re-framing of the narrative of domestic
violence. Pity for abused women trapped in marriages to brutal men
morphed into a presumption that wives should simply end the relationship.
In the no-fault era, women were blamed not only for the abuse they suffered, but also for their self-defensive violence.o0
The illusion of easy divorce-on-demand merged with two other myths
to require abused women to exit the marriage to establish their credibility:
1) an overestimation of their ability to support themselves and their children
through paid work and 2) psychosocial trends that associated their behavior
with masochism and irrationality. In the types of cases that police, prosecutors, judges, and jurors had once regarded with paternalistic sympathy,
abused women now faced apathy, skepticism, and a tendency of criminaljustice personnel to empathize with their batterers.
IV.

WORKING MOTHERS, WORKPLACE DESEGREGATION, AND THE
ILLUSION OF ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE

The changes in family law described in Part III occurred in the context of a larger reshaping of gender roles, including women's increased participation in the labor market. Waning protectiveness toward women must
be viewed against the backdrop of women's new claims about work in the
second half of the twentieth century. Yet, despite a few feminist victories in
the workplace, survivors of intimate-partner abuse still possessed limited
prospects for independence and safety.
Some American women have always worked, whether in the field or
factory, as domestic servants or as the operators of taverns and boarding

Mediators, guardians ad litem, custody evaluators, and judges confusing
abuse with conflict may . . . conclude that the parents who oppose shared
parenting are acting vindictively and subordinating the interests of the children to their own rather than expressing their legitimate anxieties about
their own and their children's ongoing safety. Ironically, within the friendly
parent framework, a mother's proper concern about her abusive partner's
fitness to parent will negatively affect her chance to win custody, not his. At
the same time, the abuser's willingness to share the children, which assures
his ongoing access to his partner and allows him to continue to manipulate
and intimidate her, will . . . make him appear the more attractive candidate
for custody.
Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide:ProtectingBattered Parentsand their Children
in the Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTs. REv. 273, 277 (1999).
109. See infra notes 184-188 and accompanying text and supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
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houses.no Immigrants, free blacks, the very poor, and those lacking male
support toiled for subsistence wages in gender-segregated jobs throughout
the nineteenth century,", but white women seeking to maintain their respectability had limited employment options. Before the mid twentieth century, married white women generally worked only if the family was
destitute, while single girls might hold a job until marriage. The vast majority of female employees remained in low-paid, gender-segregated positions
that had cultural connections to nurturance or domesticity.112 Despite the
symbolism of Rosie the Riveter, it was not until after World War I that
middle-class mothers entered the workforce in large numbers. In the Cold
War era, working women challenged assumptions about traditional gender
roles, but simultaneously created a veneer of equality in employment that
hid the disturbing reality of mother-headed, single-parent families below the
poverty line. Increasing pressure for women to leave violent relationships to
prove their credibility and rationality must be seen in this context.
When commercial production eclipsed household manufactures, including homespun cloth, in the early nineteenth century, single "working
girls" migrated to the mills to seek employment. Yet they maintained ties to
domesticity by living in supervised boarding houses, such as those Francis
Cabot Lowell established in Massachusetts, and by following paternalistic
regulations." Subsequent generations of women were even more constrained by the nineteenth-century domestic code, which "held that the
home required [a] woman's moral and spiritual presence far more than her
wage labor."" 4 Only the most destitute married women worked for pay
outside the home.," After the Lowell mill system disintegrated, single girls
seeking employment were limited to feminine occupations like teaching and
nursing, 116or targeted by middle- and upper-class reformers who sought to
provide factory girls with the discipline, domestic skills, and the morality of
an "alternate family" through club membership.7
110. ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE EARNING WOMEN
IN THE UNITED STATES 3-19 (1982).
111. Id. at 46, 72; LYNN Y. WEINER, FROM WORKING GIRL TO WORKING MOTHER:
THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1820-1980 4 (1985).
112. See infra notes 121-127, 140-143 and accompanying text.
113. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 110, at 20-38 (describing how household production
declined and young, single women entered the labor force in the heavily-supervised
Lowell-style mills of the 1820s and 1830s).
114. Id at 49.
115. See id at 51 ("For his wife to be earning income meant that the husband had
failed.").
116. Id. at 56-57, 76.
117. Id. at 93-94 (discussing the efforts of Grace Hoadley Dodge, who founded the first
Working Girls' Society in New York City in 1885); see PRISCILLA MUROLO, THE
COMMON GROUND OF WOMANHOOD: CLAsS, GENDER, AND WORKING GIRLS'
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After 1890, married women entered the labor force in greater numbers."" A minority did so to afford new consumer items, but due to the
resilience of the social stigma attached to the working wife, most took paid
work only as "a final defense against destitution.""' More affluent single
women sought employment when labor-saving innovations like washing
machines and store-bought bread freed them from helping with household
tasks.120 Yet these educated women who found jobs during the Progressive
Era tended to do so in occupations like social work, which were "loosely
construed as nurturing."l21 The professions remained stratified by gender,
and newly-trained female home economists "spent their best efforts trying
to convince less privileged women to perform housework more productively
and childcare more efficiently."122 Women of every class were thus con-

strained by social attitudes privileging marriage and family and denying female workers equal wages1 2 3 and entrance into certain occupations in the
name of preserving their respectability.124
Although the temporary opportunities that opened during World War
I and the achievement of women's suffrage in 1920 gave female workers
new aspirations beyond mere subsistence, "a careful look at what was happening to women in [the 1920s] provided no grounds for assuming they
were on their way to equality."125 Alice Kessler-Harris estimates:
[B]etween 1910 and 1940, from 86 to 90 percent of all women
worked in only ten occupations-an occupational concentration
that contributed to the ability to assign low wages and poor status to these jobs. . .. [It] was understood that women would stay
in the lower ranks and drop out after marriage. To be sure, ambitious women and married career women flourished among the
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privileged and the well-educated. Still, by the end of the [1920s],
only one out of every fifteen married women worked for a living,
and most of these were still poor and black.12 6
The wartime influx of new female workers was small, and, despite temporary increases in pay, women's wages declined after the armistice.1 27 Moreover, whether a mother worked outside the home or not, she remained
exclusively responsible for childrearing.1 28 Thus, although the popular press
emphasized the independence of the "new woman" and her contribution to
the war effort,129 female socioeconomic self-sufficiency was still largely an
illusion in the 1910s and 1920s.
The continued protectiveness of the criminal justice system toward
female victims of intimate-partner violence during the Progressive Era indicates that police, courts, and jurors recognized this reality.130 Of course,
many battered women did try to leave, and those who stayed sometimes
found work to support husbands who failed to provide for them. Despite
rhetoric depicting the abused wife as a pathetic, helpless figure, intimatepartner abuse victims were often quite resourceful. They ran boarding
houses, worked in the garment industry, and took other jobs available to
women at the time.' 3 ' However, rather than challenging patriarchy, the employment of abused wives was perceived to arise from desperation; their
need to work simply confirmed contemporary associations of wife beating
with idle, drunken men. A typical complaint to the court emphasized this
stock narrative:
Mrs. Abbott states that Abbott is a shiftless man, unwilling to
work, and as they have no means she is compelled to support
herself. Abbott has been in the habit of making frequent demands upon her for money, and becoming tired of having to
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ends meet through paid work. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The DiscretionaryPower of
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n.364 (2002) (discussing several intimate-murder victims who supported themselves
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support herself and him too, she at last refused to accede to his
demands, whereupon, she states, Abbott threatened her life.132
Two crises in twentieth-century America-the Great Depression and
World War II-failed to change either the gender segmentation of the work
force or the dominant ideology that required women to excuse their employment as conditioned on family (or patriotic) need. Although women's
proportion of the work force crept up to about 25% in the 1930s,133 female
industrial employees worked apologetically, out of economic necessity, to
provide food and shoes for their children. 1 4 Those who were married often
hid that status to preserve their jobs in the face of heightened opposition to
the employment of wives.' 3 5
Despite hostility to female workers in a period of vast male unemployment, married women were able keep their jobs or obtain new ones because
they worked in traditionally female occupations or in new unskilled production processes that were replacing the skilled positions formerly held by
men. 36 Yet, "[w]orking class women themselves generally agreed with the
prevailing sentiment that married women should not have jobs while male
breadwinners were desperate for work, and they were often reluctant to replace men directly."' 1 The Depression experience thus disrupted neither
the sexual division of labor nor the ideology of a "woman's place"; indeed,
the latter was actually strengthened by the resurgence of cultural norms censuring married women for employment outside the home.' 3 8
Both scholarly and popular understanding of women's economic mobilization during World War II conjure the ubiquitous image of Rosie the
Riveter, a housewife in factory clothing displaying her muscled arm. Indeed,
the U.S. government conducted a propaganda campaign designed to convince wives to take their husbands' places in the factory and the mill when
the men went to battle.'1 However, historians of female workers during this
period have shown that the sexual division of labor did not end in the
132. A Husband's Threats, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F.), Feb. 22, 1890, at 3, col. D.
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1930s than ever before, despite the backlash against this.").
134. MILKMAN, supra note 133, at 33.
135. Id.; see WEINER, supra note 111, at 109-10.
136. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 110, at 251, 260-61, 271; MILKMAN, supra note 133 at
28.
137. MILKMAN, supra note 133, at 32.
138. Id. at 8, 28, 33.
139. KESSLER-HARRIs, supra note 110, at 275; WEINER, supra note 111, at 110.

2013]

THE EXIT MYTH

25

194 0s. Ruth Milkman contends, for example, that "Rosie the Riveter did a
'man's job,' but more often than not she worked in a predominantly female
department or job classification." 4 0 Even when wartime women took on
specific tasks thought to be men's work, such gains were temporary.14 1 The
resurgence of domesticity, the use of seniority systems to oust women in
favor of returning veterans, and an ideology depicting trading "factory goggles for an apron" as the "patriotic" thing to do contributed to the reconstruction of a strict sexual division of labor.142 But perhaps most
importantly, management wanted to end its wartime experiment with female substitution by purging women from "men's jobs," and male unionists
abetted this aim.' 43
When World War II ended, many women quit their jobs or were laid
44
off.' Moreover, while both the government and private industry had recognized the social need for childcare centers to allow women to participate
in the labor force during the war, more than a thousand centers closed when
the war ended.14 5 The number of working mothers did not just return to
pre-war levels, but in fact continued to rise; yet, in the 1950s, their
problems were defined as individual, not social, and relatives had to step in
to care for children pejoratively labeled "daytime orphans."' 4 6
Before the Depression and World War II eras, working-class mothers,
who could not afford servants or for-profit day nurseries, turned to kin and
neighbors. If they were widowed or deserted, they might benefit from charity or state pensions inadequately designed to keep women home. At worst,
they faced the threat of child removal.' 4 7 During the national crises of the
1930s and 194 0s, government-funded daycare and child supervision offered
by private employers, such as the Kaiser ship-building firm, offered welcome
but still insufficient respite. 4 8 Yet, like gender-based job segregation and
unequal pay, the childcare dilemma was a problem for which the partial
solutions reached during the Great Depression and World War II proved
ephemeral.
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Indeed, World War II heralded less of a sea change than is often
thought. Three-quarters of women who had paid employment during the
war had worked before, and the majority of wives who entered the labor
force for the first time during this period were more than thirty-five years
old.' 4 9 Indeed, official policy during the war years discouraged mothers of
small children from working. 1o It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that married mothers of infants and pre-school children entered the workplace in appreciable numbers'is and that equality claims were
widely used to challenge gender-based employment segregation and wage
disparities.
In sum, until the middle of the twentieth century, the dominant social
ideology encouraged husbands to be breadwinners and wives to take care of
the home and family. Working-class women rarely fit this image; yet, as
long as they apologetically claimed financial need or patriotic duty and
worked in so-called "feminine" jobs that preserved their ties to domesticity,
they did not pose a serious threat to the foundations of either the home or
the labor market. Thus, prior to mid-century, the main targets of punitive
state intervention in intimate relationships were men who failed to play
properly industrious and protective roles. Battered women were not presumed capable of easily leaving a violent marriage because neither employers, nor the state, nor society supported the idea of wives and mothers being
paid to work.
The biggest shift in both social attitudes and actual numbers of
women in the workforce came in the second half of the twentieth century.
Driven by a desire for consumer goods and services, the dual-income family
began to emerge in the 1950s, despite a post-war feminine mystique that
exalted the role of the full-time housewife and mother.152 Whereas women
constituted only 29% of the labor force in 1950, their numbers had reached
40% by 1975. Only about a third of all women worked in 1950, about half
of them at part-time jobs; by contrast, nearly half of all women worked in
1975, and more than 70% of them had full-time positions.1 5 3 Indeed, by
the 1970s, more than 40% of wives had jobs, many of them younger
54
women with children-a dramatic change that "stunned analysts."
New attitudes on the part of employers and the state meant that, in
the second half of the twentieth century, women were actually encouraged
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to move into the labor market. 55 Popular sentiment changed, too. In 1976,
a Gallup Poll reported that 68% of those surveyed approved of women
working, even if their husbands could support them-an increase of fifty
percentage points from responses to the same question in 1936.156 Myriad
publications in a variety of fields urged that women be allowed to find a
truer perception of self by choosing from a range of options, including both
marriage and a career.' 57 Yet the demands did not stop with a right to employment. As the majority of women moved into wage work, they began to
challenge assumptions about their primary role as caregivers-assumptions
that had entrenched wage inequality and job segregation, as well as a traditionally gendered division of work within the family.'58
Two conflicting features of this altered society and economy are noteworthy. First, the feminist campaign for an Equal Rights Amendment, reproductive freedom, the acceptance of two-career families, and the ability of
women to live independently from men produced a vigorous backlash.59
Second, resentment and fear, and even acceptance, of women's new place in
the work force involved a presumption that women had actually achieved a
degree of autonomy that, in fact, remained elusive. Whereas two wage earners had once enabled a family to afford more luxurious forms of consumption, by the late twentieth century, one wage earner could scarcely make
ends meet. Women were locked into paid work by the changing economy,
despite the traditionalists' fantasy of turning the clock back to a time when
the majority of wives stayed home.60 But in the early 1980s, most women
"still occupied limited kinds of jobs with limited opportunities; and a disproportionate degree of poverty still characterized female-headed families."161 While the traditional ideal of the father as the sole breadwinner had
declined, the reality of mothers' entry into the work force had not produced
any solution or consensus regarding the childcare dilemma.162
To summarize: just as no-fault divorce failed to offer a silver bullet for
women in violent marriages, the rise of female employment did not erase
the pay gap, the need for affordable childcare, or the existence of sex discrimination and harassment in the workplace. Despite such lingering obstacles to autonomy, the increased availability of female employment
opportunities made a battered woman's claim that she could not escape
155. See id. at 303, 308.
156. WEINER, supra note 111, at 117.
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abuse by her male intimate partner-at least not without assistance and
perhaps not without self-defensive violence-seem less sympathetic and less
credible than in the past. Police, prosecutors, jurors, and judges imposed the
often unrealistic expectation that she choose an avenue of exit. Hence,
changes in gender roles created a "why didn't she leave?" question that had
rarely been asked when the dominant social assumption was that wives and
mothers should not seek paid work.
V. PSYCHOSOCIAL UNDERSTANDINGS

OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

The real and perceived changes in women's economic independence
and ability to obtain a divorce did not alone reshape attitudes to domestic
violence cases. In the second half of the twentieth century, the popularization of psychological theories linking intimate-partner abuse to female mas-

ochism also contributed to a new era of assigning blame to victims both for
the domestic violence they suffered and for failing to separate from their
abusers. This trend had repercussions in criminal cases.
Prior to the mid twentieth century, women who used violence were
sometimes depicted as insane or hysterical.' 6 3 Yet, despite the focus in feminist scholarship on sexist images of female mental instability,164 nineteenthand early twentieth-century women who killed their abusers often obtained
acquittals on self-defense grounds, rather than being forced to plead insanity. Abused women could and did present evidence of past abuse to help
juries understand why they used lethal violence against their male intimate
partners.' 65 Even in non-confrontational cases, the unwritten law justifying
a wronged woman's retaliation for abuse allowed many female defendants to
obtain acquittal when the facts of their cases did not comport with the black
letter self-defense doctrine.' 66 Indeed, the dilemma of wives who depended
financially on and feared physical retaliation by abusive men was commonly
understood as a rational one, as opposed to being associated with a
syndrome. 167
163. For example, defense attorneys and other observers often attributed the killing of a
child by its mother to her insanity. See Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 3, at

126-27. More rarely, women who killed their husbands were deemed so completely
delusional that their cases were dismissed before trial. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, Pro-
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The influence of psychological theories blaming the victim for intimate-partner violence became most pronounced in the middle of the twentieth century. Writing in the 194 0s, Helene Deutsch, a disciple of Freud,
theorized that a young girl's relationship with her father might result in a
split between an active, masculine approach to life and sexual fantasies of
"an extraordinarily passive and masochistic character."16 " As adults, "active"
women might "display particular resistance and aggressiveness in the struggle for life," but in their sexual behavior, "either they remain erotically isolated, avoiding all dangers, or fall victims to brutal men."' 69 Deutsch also
theorized the existence of a "masculinity complex" that was "characterized
by the predominance of active and aggressive tendencies that lead to conflicts with the woman's environment and above all with the remaining feminine inner world."1oo Normal femininity could be achieved only if the
woman subordinated her own goals and pursuits to those of her husband or
son.1 7 ' In some women-female revolutionary leaders, for example-masochistic tendencies combined with the masculinity complex and resulted not
only in the woman's self-sacrifice for her ideas, but also in her association
with tyrannical lovers.172
Deutsch attributed abused women's inability to leave their batterers to
their "masochistic ties" and described social-welfare cases involving victims
who insisted upon returning to brutal drunks, despite agency efforts to assist them. In Deutsch's analysis, "[tiheir psychic dependence is concealed
behind the economic one; all attempts to help them fail because, even when
freed of their external dependence, they again and again find skilfully [sic]
rationalized ways of falling under the subjection of brutal, weak, or undesirable men."173 Assessing the case of a young woman who came to Hull
House after being beaten almost to death by her lover, for example, Deutsch
concluded that the woman subsequently returned to her abuser because
"[s]he was enslaved by her masochism, the strongest of all forms of love.""17
The greatest harm of such psychological theories came from their popularization and dissemination in books and magazines consumed by the
general public.17 Penis envy and the masculinity complex became the prevailing explanations for feminism, for women's entry into the workplace to
168. 1 HELENE DEUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 247 (1944).
169. Id. at 252 ("The feminine woman is evidently much better equipped to control her
feminine masochism than is the active type.")
170. Id. at 289.
171. BETrY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 121 (1974) (summarizing Deutsch's
theory).
172. DEUTSCH, supra note 168, at 274-75.
173. Id. at 270.
174. Id at 269.
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achieve freedom and equality with men, and for the dissatisfaction of housewives who worried that their role had declined in social esteem.1 7 6 As described in Part IV, conciliation courts associated with the therapeutic
divorce movement often blamed wives for their marital problems and prescribed a return to traditional gender roles as a solution obviating the need
for divorce in individual cases. 177 Moreover, the popular press of the 194 0s,
1950s, and 1960s reflected and entrenched societal resentment both of
changing gender roles and of legal mandates like alimony that erroneously
came to symbolize female emancipation. 1 7 8
Betty Friedan was most concerned about the way "uncritical acceptance of Freudian doctrine in America" produced the "feminine mystique"that is, the reassertion, in the postwar era, of the prescriptive ideal of wife
and mother.'7 But the effect on public responses to intimate-partner violence may have been equally pronounced. Newspaper articles, advice columns, and cartoons in popular magazines like Harper's attributed domestic
violence inflicted on wives to female masochism and assaults perpetrated by
women to female mental instability.so When "Beaten and Bruised" sought
advice from Abigail Van Buren in 1962, for instance, the "Dear Abby" columnist smugly retorted: "A man who would repeatedly give his wife a crack
across the jaw is sick. And a woman who would stick around for a repeat
performance is sicker than the guy who hits her. Find a psychiatrist with
two couches."'81 Two years later, in 1964, the Washington Post reported on a
study by three psychiatrists who claimed that "wife beating . .. 'may serve

to fill a wife's needs even though she protests it.'82
According to the Post,
the psychiatric study further described battered women as "aggressive, masculine, masochistic and frigid," and concluded that "[a] domineering
wife . . . has a sense of guilt that is relieved by occasional beatings."183
No-fault divorce supplanted the therapeutic approach, and secondwave feminism and the influx of middle-class, white mothers with small
children into the work force challenged the feminine mystique. Nevertheless, the popularization of psychological theories blaming women for intimate-partner abuse made its mark: by the 1960s and 1970s, the widespread
acceptance of such theories had contributed to the apathetic criminal justice
176.
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response to domestic violence that battered women's advocates and feminist
scholars so frequently criticize.1 8 4 Police and prosecutors may have really
believed that domestic violence arose from "gendered maladies such as menopause," as one NYPD training manual from the 1970s suggested,'18 and
that wives needed a beating now and then to keep them in line. 186 In any
event, law enforcers increasingly favored so-called "therapeutic" modes of
crisis intervention, such as separating the couple and walking the man
around the block, for what were by then perceived to be "family squabbles,"
rather than crimes.18 7 Judges referred male defendants to diversion programs, or at most gave them lenient sentences, and blamed domestic battery
on the wife's provocative behavior or simply on marital stress.18 8 Whereas
battered wives had once been perceived as rational actors by a paternalistic
yet sympathetic system, their inability to escape their batterers had been
pathologized and their use of self-defensive violence condemned by the second half of the twentieth century.
VI. CONCLUSION

The standard feminist narrative about the refusal of police, prosecutors, and courts to intervene in intimate-partner violence was effective as a
political message undergirding the battered women's movement, but it belies the origins of the Exit Myth. Adhering to a static picture of unrelenting,
state-sponsored misogyny and a virtual wall of privacy shielding intimate-

partner violence in the home neither helps scholars develop a more sophisticated understanding of gender relations nor encourages them to explore the
nuanced history of efforts to balance aggressive governmental action against
domestic abuse with concerns about victim well-being and autonomy. The
time has come to reexamine the legal history of intimate-partner violence.
Scholars need to achieve a better understanding of the complex relationship
between the criminal justice system and such violence, which second-wave
184. See Miccio, supra note 1, at 254-55.
185. Id. at 282-83 (citing criticisms leveled at NYPD training by family law attorney
Marjory Fields in her testimony before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in
1978).
186. See, e.g., Gordon Grant, Family Fights Tough and Messy, Say Police, L.A. TIMEs, Feb.
12, 1967, at SFC1 (indicating that officers attributed some "family Fights" to female masochism).
187. See id. (describing how one officer in a Los Angeles suburb would routinely separate
a couple in response to a domestic violence call and tell the wife that she should not
press charges because her husband was "the breadwinner ... the guy who brings
home the paycheck"); see also Miccio, supra note 1, at 275.
188. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 22-23 (discussing a psychiatrist's study of the criminal
justice response to twenty-three intimate-partner violence cases in the early 1970s).
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feminism sought to combat as part of its campaign against gender-based
dominance.
Second-wave feminists were not the first to identify and try to remedy
the problem of battering, however. Prior to the mid-twentieth century, the
state intervened in intimate-partner violence to censure men for abusing
their marital authority and for failing to perform the role of the sober breadwinner who protected and provided for his wife and children. The state thus
tried to use its power to enforce the ideology of the separate spheres, while,
at the same time, its intervention blurred the boundary between the family
and the public.
When the separate spheres ideology waned, the paternalistic assumption that a battered wife lacked few practical avenues to escape domestic
violence gave way to a new prescription for women to use their expanded
opportunities for divorce and employment outside the home to leave their
abusers. Psychological theories dismissed women who stayed with their batterers as masochistic. Yet changes in gender roles were resented and less farreaching than many Americans presumed, and many victims of intimatepartner abuse remained trapped in violent relationships and ignored by the
legal system. Indeed, as a result of women's incomplete gains in the workplace and in divorce courts, abuse victims from the mid 1900s through the
1970s (and even into the 1980s) may have encountered a less sympathetic
criminal-justice response than their predecessors in the early twentieth century had. t

